This paper examines how each parent's bargaining power affects intrahousehold resource allocations to children's nutrition and education. I test whether the marriage market condition summarized by the sex ratio affects the allocations and whether the parental resources are pooled. I also derive...

This paper studies the effect that mother's education as knowledge has on child health using height for age as health measure. Using cross sectional data from de 1993 South Africa Integrated Household Survey, and health measures form de National Center for Health Statistics, we find a...

This paper sets out a theoretical framework for models of the household production and labour supply decisions of families, and estimates empirical specifications on time use survey data containing information on labour supply, domestic work and pure leisure. The models are then compared with...

Whether the family makes decisions as a unit or through a collective decision making process has been tested elsewhere by examining whether the income pooling hypothesis holds or by examining whether premarital assets have significant effects on household consumptions. The results, however, may...

We examine the question of which household members should consume medical services, and in what quantities, by using Japanese household-level data. We employ two key concepts, health risk and income risk, and investigate whether family heads or dependents bear these risks. Health risk is the...

This paper presents a simulation analysis of several policies, or policy proposals, for improving housing affordability for first home owner-occupiers in Australia: the First Home Owner Grant, housing equity partnerships and deposit loans. The focus is on the impact of these measures for housing...

This paper derives firm boundaries as the outcome of an equilibrium coordination mechanism. The analysis is premised on the notion that efficient production and distribution are achieved through a mechanism that coordinates three basic activities: i) input acquisition, ii) production, iii)...

A holdup model is analyzed in which one party, the seller, has an investment project that the other party, the buyer, can subsidize. The investment project remains the seller's; she cannot transfer her entire control rights to it. In particular, she can always refuse to allow the buyer to...

In this paper, an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game is considered. The model has a two-tier relationship; two firms make a self-enforced collusive agreement and each firm writes a law-enforced contract to its privately-informed agent. The main finding is that in optimal collusion, interaction...

We analyze the formation and competition of market intermediaries when there are positive participation externalities between the two sides of the market; negative participation externalities within the same side; competition with traditional market; and implicit coordination among potential...