In this paper we provide an explicit characterization of the escape dynamics for the Phellps problem of government controlling inflation with adaptive learning of the approximate Phillips curve, alternative to the one considered by Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) (CWS in sequel). Our approach...

In this paper we provide an explicit characterization of the escape dynamics for the Phellps problem of government controlling inflation with adaptive learning of the approximate Phillips curve, alternative to the one considered by Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) (CWS in sequel). Our approach...

Specialist merchants and traders---agents who mediate the transfer of goods and services between producers and consumers---are central to the economic process, but there are few theoretical models in which the institution of intermediation is an endogenous part of an equilibrium. This paper...

In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for $N$ objects, (permits), to $I$ potential buyers, (firms). Firms' payoffs depend on their costs, the costs of competitors and on the final allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and...

In this paper we adopt Granovetter's view expressed in his famous article ''Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness'' , where he argues that the concept of man in economics is extremely undersocialized because it ignores the importance of social networks. In so doing...

This paper considers the parametric inference of a wide range of structural econometric models. The class of models considered includes those with parameter-dependent support and those derived from game-theoretic models. Inference of those models has raised some important econometric issues....

This talk will describe a stream of research in experimental economics focusing on the illumination and demonstration of other-regarding preferences (ORPs). Evidence will come primarily from public goods experiments, but also bargaining games (ultimatum, dictator, trust, ...

I argue in favor of a competitive screening approach for studying the question of coalition formation in exchange economies under asymmetric information. I obtain a new notion of core that refines Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is nonempty under the standard regularity conditions. I also...

This paper analyzes a bilateral trade problem where the seller makes hidden investment that influences the buyer's private valuation. Complete contracts can be written on observable trade decisions. It is shown that efficiency level in investment and trade is negatively related to the scope of...

This paper reports an experiment involving two mechanisms that allocate a single unit of an indivisible private good among two players, at no cost to either of them. Both mechanisms, proposed by Moore (1992) and Perry and Reny (1999), are compared in terms of their relative performance to assign...