This paper contributes to the literature comparing the relative performance of financial intermediaries and markets by studying an environment in which a trade-off between risk sharing and growth arises endogenously. Financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against a liquidity...

This paper examines the effects that capital inflows have on the financial system in a Diamond-Dybvig environment. Here, an adverse-selection problem arises where short-term capital has the incentive to enter the domestic banking system while long-term capital chooses to stay out. Then,...

The events of the 1990s, which led to the collapse of the banking sector in many countries around the world, have renewed the need to devise some preventive policies. However, the success of these preventive measures is contingent on the predictability of the crisis both in nature and extent....

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages of economic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where...

This paper derives firm boundaries as the outcome of an equilibrium coordination mechanism. The analysis is premised on the notion that efficient production and distribution are achieved through a mechanism that coordinates three basic activities: i) input acquisition, ii) production, iii)...

A holdup model is analyzed in which one party, the seller, has an investment project that the other party, the buyer, can subsidize. The investment project remains the seller's; she cannot transfer her entire control rights to it. In particular, she can always refuse to allow the buyer to...

In this paper, an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game is considered. The model has a two-tier relationship; two firms make a self-enforced collusive agreement and each firm writes a law-enforced contract to its privately-informed agent. The main finding is that in optimal collusion, interaction...

We analyze the formation and competition of market intermediaries when there are positive participation externalities between the two sides of the market; negative participation externalities within the same side; competition with traditional market; and implicit coordination among potential...

Buyers frequently delegate purchase decisions to sellers who are better informed about supply options and the cost of service. This paper analyzes how buyers optimally contract with sellers who vary in their expertise at prescribing service. We show that the most expert suppliers offer the...

This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority and consult the agent (an expert), or delegate the authority to the agent; however, the outside evaluator cannot observe the allocation of...