Showing 1 - 8 of 8
When a seller gives a buyer a right of first refusal, although it reduces the competing buyers' profits and creates an inefficiency, it always increases the joint profit of the seller and the right holder. Right of first refusal with a consideration (e.g., a payment from the right holder to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342352
Two main results have been obtained on the literature on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem. First, a contract specifying a price and quantity of the final good to be traded will, fairly generally, induce efficient investments if these are `selfish' in nature, i.e., each party's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328878
The present article provides an economic analysis to examine how contract damages affects both breach and investment decisions over time. Unlike the standard static model, this article studies a model in which, upon signing a contract, a seller invests over two periods, and a buyer may breach at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342380
We explain why organizations that limit the voice of their agents can benefit from granting them an exit option. We study a hierarchy with a principal, a productive supervisor and an agent. Communication is imperfect in that only the supervisor can communicate with the principal, while the agent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129818
We study legal restrictions on private contracting in the form of limitations on the severity of non-monetary punishments. We locate the rationale for such restrictions in externalities that parties impose on future relationships: punishments that lower an agent's future productivity may lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699686
In its standard “public choice” form, the mechanism-design framework abstracts from institutional and technological constraints beyond those that the modeler can represent in the definition of states, outcomes, and preferences. This abstraction can create a useful simplification. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063593
Tax treaties are often viewed as a mechanism for eliminating tax competition, however, this approach ignores the need for bargaining over the treaty’s terms. This paper makes a first attempt at modeling the conflicting goals in treaty formation by analyzing a cooperative bargaining model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328861
The 1993 Japanese financial system reform allowed banks to enter the underwriting market for corporate bonds through bank-owned security subsidiaries. This paper examines empirically whether underwriting commissions and spreads for corporate bonds fell as a result of this bank entry. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130153