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An Experimental Analysis of Third-Party Response to Corruption
Gangadharan, Lata; Chaudhuri, Ananish; Erkal, Nisvan - Econometric Society - 2004
It is a well-established fact that corruption is a widespread phenomenon. An important aspect of corruption is that two … has a significant impact on the persistence of corruption. This paper contributes to the experimental literature on … corruption by analyzing third-party response to corruption. We report results from a laboratory experiment in which subjects …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702531
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Commons, anti-commons, corruption and “maffia†behavior.
Canavese, Alfredo - Econometric Society - 2004
institutions and corruption. A simple game theoretic model is built to show that corruption produces a tragedy of the anticommons …. It is also shown that coordinated corruption or “maffia†behaviour produces a better use of resources than … uncoordinated corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005170267
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Bureaucratic Provision: Influencing vs. Lying
Vaidya, Samarth - Econometric Society - 2004
In this paper a public bureau can extract surplus value from the services it provides not only by misrepresenting its production costs to its oversight committee but also by influencing the perceptions of the legislative body such as the parliament or the congress and the public at large by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063617
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The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions
Lagunoff, Roger - Econometric Society - 2004
This paper formulates a model of dynamic, endogenous reform of political institutions. Specifically, a class of dynamic political games (DPGs) is introduced in which institutional choice is both recursive and instrumental. It is recursive because future political institutions are decided under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328876
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Dynamic Enfranchisement
Lagunoff, Roger; Jack, William - Econometric Society - 2004
Why would a political elite voluntarily dilute its political power by extending the voting franchise? This paper develops a dynamic recursive framework for studying voter enfranchisement. We specify a class of dynamic games in which political rights evolve over time. Each period, private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342280
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The architecture and the configuration of information-processing organizations
Kim, Jeong-Yoo; Jun, Tackseung - Econometric Society - 2004
We model a hierarchy consisting of possibly corrupted agents who process information, and consider the problem of designing the efficient hierarchy structure and configuring the agents who differ in their honesty. If the only role of agents is to report the information to their direct superior,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130245
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Mackerels in the moonlight. A model of corrupt politicians
Evrenk, Haldun - Econometric Society - 2004
This paper examines causes of the persistence of corruption among elected politicians in democracies. We study a … as potential ways of deterring political corruption. We identify conditions under which (i) imposing tax rate limits, (ii …) increasing compensation of elected politicians, and (iii) raising legal penalties for corruption, will increase corruption and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130207
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Delegated Management in Dynamic Oligopolies
Petkov, Vladimir - Econometric Society - 2004
This paper studies the strategic value of delegation in dynamic interactions, where principals provide managers with intertemporal incentives in order to obtain a competitive advantage. While direct management offers intertemporal commitment opportunities, the separation of ownership from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342160
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Growing Strategy Sets in Repeated Games
Okada, Daijiro; Neyman, Abraham - Econometric Society - 2004
A (pure) strategy in a repeated game is a mapping from histories, or, more generally, signals, to actions. We view the implementation of such a strategy as a computational procedure and attempt to capture in a formal model the following intuition: as the game proceeds, the amount of information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342187