Ascending price clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However clock auctions require congregating all bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability and introduces...

The use of dynamic auctions is a major component in many enterprises' e-procurement initiatives. In the case where suppliers offer goods and services of inherently different quality the traditional mechanism has been the request for quote. In a request for quote, suppliers submit a sealed bid...

The paper applies a popular methodology of competing risks to the analysis of the timing and interaction between the Deutsche Mark/U.S. dollar transactions, quotes, and cancellations in the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system. Consistently with previous stock market studies, the bid-ask...

We consider two mechanisms to procure differentiated goods: a request for quote and an English auction with bidding credits. In the request for quote, each seller submits a price and the inherent quality of his good. Then the buyer selects the seller who offers the greatest difference in quality...

Theories of multiple equilibria (ME) are now widespread across many fields of economics. Yet little empirical work has asked if such multiple equilibria are salient features of real economies. We examine this in the context of the Allied bombing of Japanese cities and industries in WWII in data...

We provide an alternative theoretical explanation for a number of empirical regularities relating to the dynamics of industry structrure (product life cycle) and changes in size and age distribution of firms over time. We explain why entry may continue over a considerable period of time, why...

We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy...

In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for $N$ objects, (permits), to $I$ potential buyers, (firms). Firms' payoffs depend on their costs, the costs of competitors and on the final allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and...