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Contracting with altruistic agents under moral hazard

AUBERT, Cecile - Econometric Society - 2004

family) modifies incentive costs. We derive sufficient conditions for the principal to benefit from altruism. They bear on … how altruism affects the agent's marginal rate of substitution between monetary transfers and effort. We characterize the … contracts allowing to screen agents with different degrees of altruism for additive separable utilities. When two agents who are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342252

The Dispersion of Intra-Household Human Capital Across Children: A Measurement Strategy and Evidence

Souza, Andre Portela; Horowitz, Andrew W. - Econometric Society - 2004

Human capital accumulation has long been recognized as critical to economic growth and development. In recent years focus on the intra-household distribution of human capital has intensified both theoretically and empirically. However, connecting the theoretical and empirical literature has been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328900

Intergenerational Linkages in Consumption Behavior

Cox, Donald; Ng, Serena; Waldkirch, Andreas - Econometric Society - 2000

Consumption is partly a social activity, yet most studies of consumer behavior treat households in isolation. We investigate familial relationships in consumption patterns using a sample of parents and their children from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find a positive and statistically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063539

Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions

Araujo, Aloisio; Filho, Luciano I. de Castro - Econometric Society - 2004

We give necessary and suï¬ƒcient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328867

Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities

Skreta, Vasiliki; Figueroa, Nicolas - Econometric Society - 2004

In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for $N$ objects, (permits), to $I$ potential buyers, (firms). Firms' payoffs depend on their costs, the costs of competitors and on the final allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328894

Optimal Contracts for Teams of Money Managers

Pichler, Pegaret - Econometric Society - 2004

The optimal organizational form and optimal incentive contract are characterized for a team of money managers, assuming that the investor (principal) is risk averse and that each manager's (agent's) actions affect both that manager's expected return and the correlation of returns between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328978

Identity vs. Popularity

Mialon, Sue Hwang - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper models individual choices of social groups and the formation of group identity, and examines the conditions with which the group identity reinforces the productivity of individuals. A social group is defined as a network that provides with a market for interactions to its members....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329005

Growing Strategy Sets in Repeated Games

Okada, Daijiro; Neyman, Abraham - Econometric Society - 2004

A (pure) strategy in a repeated game is a mapping from histories, or, more generally, signals, to actions. We view the implementation of such a strategy as a computational procedure and attempt to capture in a formal model the following intuition: as the game proceeds, the amount of information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342187

The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information

Porteiro, Nicolas; Dahm, Matthias - Econometric Society - 2004

We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342190

The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation

Chander, Parkash - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342201