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Punitive damage awards have been widely criticized for generating a plaintiff’s windfall (i.e., a payment in excess of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim), which promotes unnecessary litigation, the escalation of liability insurance premiums and over-deterrence. In an attempt to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063694
Punitive damage awards have been widely criticized for their unpredictability (2004 Economic Report of the President) and for generating a plaintiff’s windfall (i.e., a payment in excess of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim), which promotes unnecessary litigation (Dodson, 2000),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699597
In an attempt to reduce the liability insurance costs of firms, several US states have implemented many different kinds of tort reform. Some reforms take the form of caps or limits on punitive damage awards while others have mandated that a proportion of the award be allocated to the plaintiff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699599
In an attempt to reduce the liability insurance costs of firms, several US states have implemented many different kinds of tort reform. Some reforms take the form of caps or limits on punitive damage awards while others, called “split-awardsâ€, have mandated that a proportion of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702607
with that of arbitrators that act on principle - ignoring prior concessions. We show that while the impact of arbitration … pragmatically. What system of arbitration has the best ex-ante performance depends on the distributions of arbitration and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005170253
We study a model of civil dispute with delegation in which a plaintiff's lawyer works on a contingent fee basis but a defendant's lawyer on an hourly fee basis. We first derive the conditions under which delegation to the lawyers brings both the plaintiff and defendant more payoffs, compared to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342327
Consider the case of a firm with private valuation information bargaining with a supplier over the price and quantity of a good. If the firm and the supplier bargain directly, the bargaining outcome may not yield a first-best outcome due to the presence of information rents. The question we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328937
Empirical evidence shows that macroeconomic fundamentals have little explana-tory power for nominal exchange rates. On the other hand, the recent “microstruc-ture approach to exchange rates” has shown that most exchange rate volatility at short to medium horizons is related to order flows....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328945
We examine the impact of public information in an economy where agents also have diverse private information. Our work builds on seminal contributions by Townsend (1983) and Phelps (1983), and more recently Woodford (2002), which emphasized the importance of higher-order beliefs – that is,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328974
Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328976