Showing 1 - 10 of 84
This paper proposes a method to estimate relative ministerial weights in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, our method combines a bargaining model of government formation with maximum likelihood estimation. The data required for estimation are who formateurs are, what each party’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702713
-proof and coalition-proof literature. Intuitively, I require that an equilibrium should not prescribe in any subgame a course of … action that some coalition of players would jointly wish to deviate, given the restriction that every deviation must itself …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342239
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342190
We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328867
In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for $N$ objects, (permits), to $I$ potential buyers, (firms). Firms' payoffs depend on their costs, the costs of competitors and on the final allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328894
The optimal organizational form and optimal incentive contract are characterized for a team of money managers, assuming that the investor (principal) is risk averse and that each manager's (agent's) actions affect both that manager's expected return and the correlation of returns between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328978
This paper models individual choices of social groups and the formation of group identity, and examines the conditions with which the group identity reinforces the productivity of individuals. A social group is defined as a network that provides with a market for interactions to its members....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329005
A (pure) strategy in a repeated game is a mapping from histories, or, more generally, signals, to actions. We view the implementation of such a strategy as a computational procedure and attempt to capture in a formal model the following intuition: as the game proceeds, the amount of information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342187
that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342201
We investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanisms. We demonstrate that all social choice rules that generate a nonnegative ex-ante surplus, including ex-post efficient ones, can generically be implemented via such mechanisms. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342204