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that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342201
-link graphs form. If only a link-coalition of two-forms then they achieve the grand coalition's worth …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702641
We study a repeated Nash demand game, where bargainers follow a fictitious play procedure after their one-shot decision on demand in the initial period. In the reduced static game they play at the initial period, all the epsilon-equilibria are clustered around the division corresponding to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702751
We investigate game theoretic models of entwork formation that are based on individual actions only. Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles. (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent. (2) Link formation should be costly. (3) The class of network payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342278
in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130219
equilibrium outcomes, and we fully characterize the supportable networks. If externalities are nonpositive and a convexity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702654
This paper models individual choices of social groups and the formation of group identity, and examines the conditions with which the group identity reinforces the productivity of individuals. A social group is defined as a network that provides with a market for interactions to its members....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329005
It is wellknown that a group of individuals contributing to a joint production process with diminishing returns will tend, in equilibrium, to put in too little effort if shares of the output are exogenous, and will put in too much effort if their shares are proportional to their inputs. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063639
This paper considers the "negotiation game" (Busch and Wen, 1995) which combines the features of two-person alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibria some of which involve delay in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342231
Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342287