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Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games
Chung, Anthony Fai-Tong - Econometric Society - 2004
notion of equilibrium that refines the Nash theory in a natural way and answers to most questions raised in the renegotiation …-proof and coalition-proof literature. Intuitively, I require that an equilibrium should not prescribe in any subgame a course of … action that some coalition of players would jointly wish to deviate, given the restriction that every deviation must itself …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342239
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Precautionary Bidding in a Dynamic Model of Discrete Noncooperative Entry Deterrence
Varma, Gopal Das - Econometric Society - 2004
We consider competitive bidding for a business license, via an open ascending-price auction, between two symmetric incumbents and a potential entrant, each of whom is privately informed about her own valuation of the license. Entry stands to reduce the payoff of each incumbent below that in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342186
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An Efficiency Rationale for the Bundling of Public Goods
Norman, Peter; Fang, Hanming - Econometric Society - 2004
This paper studies the role of bundling in the efficient provision of excludable public goods. We show that bundling in the provision of unrelated public goods can enhance social welfare. With a large number of goods and agents, first best can be approximated with pure bundling. For a parametric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342210
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Tax-Price Competition for Internationalized Public Goods
Kuroda, Tatsuaki - Econometric Society - 2004
any relative size of population and for any degree of differentiation; 3) While, in standard theory of game or oligopoly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342357
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Group Size and Social Ties in Microfinance Institutions
Abbink, Klaus; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Econometric Society - 2004
Microfinance programmes provide poor people with small loans given to jointly liable self-selected groups. Follow-up loans provide incentives to repay. In an experiment we investigate the influence of those features on strategic default. Each group member invests in an individual risky project,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342371
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Do Informal Sanctions Increase Cooperation in the Long Run?
Noussair, Charles; Tucker, Steven - Econometric Society - 2004
We conduct an experiment to explore the durability and transferability of the increase in contributions to a public good resulting from the existence of a particular type of implicit informal sanction. Rege and Telle (2003) find that in one-shot games, the sanctioning system leads to high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130161
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A Collective Model of Household Behavior with Private and Public Goods: Theory and Evidence from US Data
Donni, Olivier - Econometric Society - 2004
In this paper, we adopt the collective approach to consumer behavior --- which supposes that each household member is characterized by his/her own preferences and the decision process results in Pareto-efficient outcomes --- and assume, in addition, that agents are egoistic and consumption is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699621
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Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions
Araujo, Aloisio; Filho, Luciano I. de Castro - Econometric Society - 2004
We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328867
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Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities
Skreta, Vasiliki; Figueroa, Nicolas - Econometric Society - 2004
In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for $N$ objects, (permits), to $I$ potential buyers, (firms). Firms' payoffs depend on their costs, the costs of competitors and on the final allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328894
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Optimal Contracts for Teams of Money Managers
Pichler, Pegaret - Econometric Society - 2004
The optimal organizational form and optimal incentive contract are characterized for a team of money managers, assuming that the investor (principal) is risk averse and that each manager's (agent's) actions affect both that manager's expected return and the correlation of returns between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328978