We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … efficient network to be supportable as an equilibrium. In cases where transfers can be made contingent on the network, then any … efficient network is supportable as an equilibrium. We also consider a refinement of equilibrium that allows pairs of players to …

with which the group identity reinforces the productivity of individuals. A social group is defined as a network that … the expected transaction costs in each group. Due to network externality, there is a higher value of transaction and more …

should be costly. (3) The class of network payoff functions should be as general as possible. We provide charecterizations of … network formation. We provide comparisons of the resulting networks with networks satisfying well known stability concepts …

, and tractable ones exist for all three-agent A-M-like network games with any fixed valuation, in contrast to restricted …

formed if members of the coalition are connected on a communication network, or a graph. We offer a characterization of non …-manipulable division rules without any assumption on the structure of communication network. As corollaries, we obtain a number of earlier … characterization results established with the assumption of complete network (complete graph) in various specialized settings. Moreover …