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that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342201
We investigate game theoretic models of entwork formation that are based on individual actions only. Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles. (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent. (2) Link formation should be costly. (3) The class of network payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342278
in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130219
-link graphs form. If only a link-coalition of two-forms then they achieve the grand coalition's worth …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702641
We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may promise or demand transfer payments when forming links. If players may only make such transfers on the links they are directly involved with, then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702654
We study a repeated Nash demand game, where bargainers follow a fictitious play procedure after their one-shot decision on demand in the initial period. In the reduced static game they play at the initial period, all the epsilon-equilibria are clustered around the division corresponding to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702751
-proof and coalition-proof literature. Intuitively, I require that an equilibrium should not prescribe in any subgame a course of … action that some coalition of players would jointly wish to deviate, given the restriction that every deviation must itself …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342239
The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms, and blocking may similarly be organized by an incentive compatible mediation plan. Nonemptiness is proven for games with a balanced structure
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342211
individual characteristic vectors within a coalition (e.g. reallocation of claims in bankruptcy problems). A coalition can be … formed if members of the coalition are connected on a communication network, or a graph. We offer a characterization of non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130230
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702645