We explain why organizations that limit the voice of their agents can benefit from granting them an exit option. We study a hierarchy with a principal, a productive supervisor and an agent. Communication is imperfect in that only the supervisor can communicate with the principal, while the agent...

Consider the case of a firm with private valuation information bargaining with a supplier over the price and quantity of a good. If the firm and the supplier bargain directly, the bargaining outcome may not yield a first-best outcome due to the presence of information rents. The question we...

Venture capitalists enjoy incentive-laden compensation schemes where they are paid a fixed amount (management fees) plus a share of profit (success fees). This scheme is of course intended to provide venture capitalists with strong incentives under the heavy information asymmetry (Sahlman, 1982,...

This paper studies the strategic value of delegation in dynamic interactions, where principals provide managers with intertemporal incentives in order to obtain a competitive advantage. While direct management offers intertemporal commitment opportunities, the separation of ownership from...

The “mushroom treatment� is a common metaphor for the practice of “keeping employees in the dark and feeding them a steady diet of bull manure.� We develop a model of this practice of information suppression and misrepresentation within organizations,...

This paper analyzes the changes in the transaction structure of auto parts makers in Korea’s automobile industry since the currency crisis of 1997. Examining the auto parts transaction structure during the years from 1996 to 1999, it turns out that the number of assembly companies working...

Most existing theories of the firms define a firm as a collection of physical assets, and hence can not explain the firm from a human-asset perspective, which is of particular importance for understanding human-capital intensive firms. To fill in the gap, this paper proposes an alternative...

This paper provides a framework that aims at distinguishing the technological economies of vertical integration from the vertical economies resulting from market imperfections. To illustrate our analyze, we use consistent panel data econometric methods to estimate cost functions on a sample of...

The access pricing problem emerges when a vertically integrated firm (the incumbent) provides an essential service in the upstream market, to an entrant. Both firms produce a final service and compete in the downstream market. The standard treatment of this problem has been to add the access...

This paper derives firm boundaries as the outcome of an equilibrium coordination mechanism. The analysis is premised on the notion that efficient production and distribution are achieved through a mechanism that coordinates three basic activities: i) input acquisition, ii) production, iii)...