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The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

Irfanoglu, Zeynep B.; Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014

This experimental study compares sequential and simultaneous election contests. Consistent with the theory, we find …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884877

Trust, Reciprocity and Rules

Rietz, Thomas A.; Schniter, Eric; Sheremeta, Roman M.; … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2011

In the absence of enforceable contracts, many economic and personal interactions rely on trust and reciprocity. Research shows that although this reliance often works well, sometimes it breaks down. Simple rules mandating minimum standards on reciprocation prevent the most egregious trust...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009295318

A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments

Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010575500

Do Prediction Markets Aid Defenders in a Weak-Link Contest?

Deck, Cary; Hao, Li; Porter, David - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states (moves) of nature. However, in many practical applications one might want to predict the move of a strategic participant. This is particularly important...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817386

Sustaining Group Reputation.

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Rubin, Jared - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

this problem by forming institutions that sustain trade using group, rather than individual, reputation. Groups can employ … two mechanisms to uphold reputation that are generally unavailable to isolated individuals: information sharing and in … reputation and increasing gains from trade. We find that information sharing encourages path dependence via group reputation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817393

Single- and Double-Elimination All-Pay Tournaments

Deck, Cary; Kimbrough, Erik O. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014

Tournaments consisting of iterative matches are a common mechanism for determining how to allocate a prize. While participants are focused on their own outcomes, tournament organizers often have objectives such as maximizing the total investment or effort by the participants over the course of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817395

Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto Games

Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2015

In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game (budget constraints satisfied in expectation) and the Colonel Blotto game (budget constraints hold with probability one) to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213300

Resolving Conflicts by a Random Device

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2011

We examine conflict resolution via a random device. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for a fixed prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. In equilibrium, risk-neutral agents with relatively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323518

Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647549

Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2010

The equilibrium of a two-stage conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding stage-one offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693684