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Religious Identity and the Provision of Public Goods: Evidence from the Indian Princely States.

Chaudhary, Latika; Rubin, Jared - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

in the religion of rulers in the Indian Princely States in the early 20th century. The Indian Princely States had … significant variation in the religion of the ruler (primarily Hindu and Muslim), often due to unique historical experiences. Using … data from the 1911 census, we fin d that Muslim-ruled states had lower Hindu literacy but the religion of the ruler had no …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699800

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Chowdhury, Subhasish M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817381

Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence

Shupp, Robert; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Schmidt, David; … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817382

Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Turocy, … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and ?nd both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and signi?cant variation of efforts,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817408

Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results.

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Masters, William A.; Cason, Timothy N. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

This study provides a unified theoretical and experimental framework in which to compare three canonical types of competition: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817416

Overdissipation and Convergence in Rent-seeking Experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules.

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Turocy, … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overdissipation relative to Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817421

Behavioral Dimensions of Contests

Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014

The standard theoretical description of rent-seeking contests is that of rational individuals or groups engaging in socially inefficient behavior by exerting costly effort. Experimental studies find that the actual efforts of participants are significantly higher than predicted in the models...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884876

Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2009

This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can better comply with theoretical predictions than … individuals in contests. Our experiment replicates previous findings that individual players significantly overbid relative to … individual players. The new findings of our experiment are that groups make 25% lower bids, their bids have lower variance, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008556045

The Equivalence of Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2010

We use a Tullock-type contest model to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically and revenue equivalent to each other. We consider a two-player contest, where outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008556046

A generalized Tullock contest

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2010

We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be used to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008556050