We analyze the impact of labor demand and labor market regulations on the corporate structure of firms. We find that higher wages are associated with lower monitoring, irrespective of whether these high wages are caused by labor market regulatio ns, unions or higher labor demand. These...

This paper argues that moderate unemployment insurance not only reduces the uncertainty faced by risk-averse workers but also improves efficiency and raises output. We develop a model in which the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient without unemployment insurance, because the labor market...

We analyse an economy where production is subject to moral hazard.

In market economies, identical workers receive very different wages, violating the Walrasian 'law of one price'. We argue that in the absence of a Walrasian auctioneer to coordinate trade, wage dispersion among identical workers is an equilibriu m phenomenon. Moreover, wage dispersion is...

I consider an economy where skilled and unskilled workers use different technologies. The rate of improvement of each technology is determined by a profit-maximizing R&D sector. When there is a high proportion of skilled workers in the labor for ce, the market for skill complementary...

This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive.

This paper offers an alternative theory for the increase in unemployment and wage inequality experienced in the U.S. over the past two decades. In my model firms decide the composition of jobs and then match with skilled and unskilled workers.