This paper examines the second-best tax policy to minimize envy in the sense of Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson (1990). An allocation is $\lambda$-equitable if no agent prefers a proportion $\lambda$ of any other agent's bundle. We study the allocations that maximize $\lambda$ among...

This paper provides a conceptual framework on fair collective choice rules that synthesizes the studies of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) on the one hand and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) on the other. We show that both frameworks have the following binary relation as a common...

We consider international negotiations on the level of global pollution, and examine the Lindahl solution which determines the distribution of the pollution permits with unanimous agreement. We show various properties to clarify difficulties to achieve a Pareto efficient allocation as an...

This paper examines the tax implementability of allocations based on Foley's (1967) concept of fairness as no-envy (or envy-free) and its alternatives. An allocation is tax implementable if there exists a tax schedule under which the allocation is realized as a result of agents' optimization....

This paper examines the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem based on Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson's (1990) λ-equitability in a two-class economy. An allocation is λ-equitable if no agent envies a proportion λ of the bundle of any other agent. We examine the properties of...

This paper derives optimal commodity taxes in a two-class economy, based on Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson's (1990) λ-equitability. An allocation is λ-equitable if no agent envies a proportion λ of the bundle of any other agent. We examine the properties of Pareto undominated...