Within the class of structures introduced in [G. Bonanno, Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic, Artificial Intelligence, 171 (2007), 144-160] we consider the subclass satisfying the property that, for every state-instant pair (omega,t), there is an...

D. N. McCloskey and Stephen Ziliak have criticized economists and others for confounding statistical and substantive significance, and for committing the logical error of the transposed conditional. In doing so they sometimes misinterpret the function of significance tests. Nonetheless,...

When a significance test fails to disconfirm a hypothesis economist often interpret this as evidence that this hypothesis is valid. Six such examples are cited from recent journals. But this is a misinterpretation of what significance tests show. Presumably this misinterpretation is founded on...

Economists sometimes interpret the failure of a significance test to disconfirm a hypothesis as evidence that this hypothesis is valid. Six examples of this are cited from recent journals. But this is a as interpretation of what significance tests show. While in general it is correct that every...

We study belief change branching-time structures. First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an...

The analysis of rational play in dynamic games is usually done within a static framework that specifies a player's initial beliefs as well as his disposition to revise those beliefs conditional on hypothetical states of information. We suggest a simpler approach, where the rationality of a...

We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is "common understanding" among the players that they are all rational.

We provide a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games and is intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed definition is the qualitative notion of AGM-consistency,...

Johan van Benthem has highlighted in his work that many questions arising in the analysis of strategic interaction call for logical and computational analysis. These questions lead to both formal and conceptually illuminating answers, in that they contribute to clarifying some of the underlying...

This is the first draft of a chapter in a planned book on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, edited by Martin Peterson, to be published by Cambridge University Press. It discusses the nature of the conditionals involved in deliberation, taking the Prisoner's Dilemma game as point of departure.