This paper analyzes seller characteristics and choices in approximately 1000 eBay auctions for a particular model of PDA. Seller characteristics include frequency of selling, reputation, and the qualities of the product sold. Seller choices include the length of the auction, information provided...

This paper analyzes seller choices and outcomes in approximately 700 recent Internet auctions on eBay. The ‘Buy it Now’ option that is available in these auctions allows the seller to supplement or replace the auction with a posted price offer. We use a structural model to control...

The common characteristic of R&D joint ventures between oligopolistic competitors, arms reduction talks, and study groups in law school is cooperation with rivals. Players benefit from cooperation, but any gain by their partner weakens their own position when competing for profits, security, or...

Each of n ≥ 1 identical buyers (and m ≥ 1 identical sellers) wants to buy (sell) a single unit of an indivisible good. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is split evenly among the buyers when m n and among the sellers when m n; the long side gets...

We discuss how small group interactions overcome evolutionary problems that might otherwise erode vengefulness as a preference trait. The basic viability problem is that the fitness benefits of vengeance often do not cover its personal cost. Even when a sufficiently high level of vengefulness...

Several investors face an irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by Brownian motion with upward drift and random expiration. The �rst investor i to seize the opportunity before expiration receives the current V less a privately known cost Ci; the other investors...

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP†(Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning...

An irreversible investment opportunity has value V governed by Brownian motion with upward drift and random expiration. Human subjects choose in continuous time when to invest. If she invests before expiration, the subject receives V−C : the final value V less a given avoidable cost C ....