This paper shows that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, some dividends are distributed, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock-related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies....

It has been argued that having a contract market before the spot market enhances competition (Allaz and Vila, 1993). Taking into account the repeated nature of electricity markets, we check the robustness of the argument that the access to contract markets reduces the market power of generators....

This paper examines the decision to create barriers to arbitrage for a firm selling on two national markets. Sunk costs of market segmentation imply that the option to segment markets is more valuable the greater the variability of purchasing power between markets. One result is that a monetary...

We model a player's uncertainty about other player's strategy choices as probability distributions over their strategy sets. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in each of which every...

This paper examines retail grocery price levels with a very large (unbalanced) panel of stores that operate in well-defined local markets. We explain price variation across grocery retailers by the concentration of wholesalers and retailers, and the market share of hypermarkets (and control for...

This paper investigates why subjects in laboratory experiments on quantity precommitment games consistently choose capacities above the Cournot level - the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We argue that this puzzling regularity may be attributed to players' perceptions of their opponents' skill or...

This paper studies competition in small, concentrated and inter- related markets. Our data set consists of price information fron 543 driving schools in 250 local markets in sweden, which gives a large sample to test hypotheses on how market structure influences competition. The results show...

The paper demonstrates that, even when firms' initial moves are simultaneous, the mere opportunity to wait out the opponent's move may be as harmful as a secondmover disadvantage.

Hedging risks is an important rationale for the existence of forward markets. However, Allaz and Vila (1993) show that duopolists can also have a strategic motive to sell forward, irrespective of exogenous uncertainties. Moreover, in their model the possibility of forward trading increases...

The paper proposes a theory of the anti-competitive effects of debt finance based on the interaction between capital structure, managerial incentives, and firms' ability to sustain collusive agreements. It shows that shareholders' commitments that reduce conflicts with debtholders - such as...