The paper proposes a theory of the anti-competitive effects of debt finance based on the interaction between capital structure, managerial incentives, and firms' ability to sustain collusive agreements. It shows that shareholders' commitments that reduce conflicts with debtholders - such as...

We present a model of financial contracting in the presence of asymmetric information between entrepreneur and investor. Either liquidation threat or governance control can be used to protect investor’s interests against expropriation risk. The two parties first agree to a financial...

A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.

We develop and test a nested logit model to examine how firms choose between a rights offering and a private equity placement. We find that family-controlled firms avoid issue methods that dilute control benefits or subject them to more monitoring, in particular when the family’s control...

Using data from real estate corporations, we report that related diversification over different property types is associated with a discount while geographical diversification has no significant effect on shareholder value. Related diversification in order to exploit potential synergistic gains...

We argue that many firms become publicly traded on a stock exchange as the first stage of a longer term divestment plan. Making a direct sale of unlisted stock may be associated with great adverse selection costs. The publicly listed stock price reduces adverse selection by aggregating the...

This paper develops and tests a theory that explains the skewed distribution of the takeover gain heavily in favor of the target shareholders by considering the interacting effects of a concentrated target ownership structure; legal restrictions like the equal treatment principle and the...

The Mandatory Bid Rule (MBR) requires that any shareholder who either (i) establishes new control of a firm or (ii) takes over control by transfer of an old block position also extends an offer for the remaining shares at a fair price. For three different ownership structures, the paper analyzes...

This paper examines the stock price reactions to equity private placements and rights issues on the stockholm Stock Exchange and analyzes private placement discounts. The combined results reinforce the preliminary support for Wruck's (1989) monitoring hypothesis and the Hertzel and smith (1993)...

A well-functioning market for corporate control is considered by the EC Commission as an important method for monitoring incumbent management and for improving the allocation of resources within Europe. This article examines the regulation of corporate acquisitions in Europe as well as inherent...