This note shows that according to Lipmann and McCall´s (1986) operational definition of liquidity, incomplete markets are a necessary condition for illiquidity.

Risk-averse individuals wish that assets concentrate their payoffs in states of high marginal value (that is, highly likely or low endowment states). An asset or portfolio may fail to do so, by having payoffs uncorrelated to its owner needs or, even worse, by having them inversely related. The...

The Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is a micro prudential instrument to strengthen the liquidity position of banks. However if in extreme scenarios the LCR becomes a binding constraint, the interaction of bank behaviour with the regulatory rule can have negative externalities. We simulate...

This paper analyzes the impact of a liquidity requirement similar to the Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) on banks' funding costs and corporate lending rates. Using a dataset of 26 Dutch banks from January 2008 to December 2011, I find that banks which are just above/below their...

This paper analyzes the impact of a liquidity requirement similar to the Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) on the unsecured interbank money market and therefore on the implementation of monetary policy. Combining two unique datasets of Dutch banks from 2005 to 2011, we show that banks which...

We investigate 62 Dutch banks' liquidity behaviour between January 2004 and March 2010, when these banks were subject to a liquidity regulation that is very similar to Basel III's Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). We find that most banks hold more liquid assets against their stock of liquid...

This paper maps the empirical features of the Loan-to-Deposit (LTD) ratio with an eye on using it in macroprudential policy to mitigate liquidity risk. We inspect the LTD trends and cycles of 11 euro area countries by filtering methods and analyze the interaction between loans and deposits. We...

This paper models a financial sector in which there is a feedback between individual bank risk and aggregate funding market problems. Greater individual risk taking worsens adverse selection problems on the market. But adverse selection premia on that market push up bank risk taking, leading to...