Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealer markets in which price information is costly to gather. Whether dealers in such a market operate competitively is an empirical issue, but a difficult one to study. Data in such markets is generally not centrally recorded. We analyze a...

This paper develops a continuous-time model of liquidity provision by banks, in which customers can deposit and withdraw their funds strategically. The strategic withdrawal option introduces an incentive-compatibility problem that turns the problem of designing deposit contracts into a...

The Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is a micro prudential instrument to strengthen the liquidity position of banks. However if in extreme scenarios the LCR becomes a binding constraint, the interaction of bank behaviour with the regulatory rule can have negative externalities. We simulate...

This paper analyzes the impact of a liquidity requirement similar to the Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) on banks' funding costs and corporate lending rates. Using a dataset of 26 Dutch banks from January 2008 to December 2011, I find that banks which are just above/below their...

This paper analyzes the impact of a liquidity requirement similar to the Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) on the unsecured interbank money market and therefore on the implementation of monetary policy. Combining two unique datasets of Dutch banks from 2005 to 2011, we show that banks which...

We investigate 62 Dutch banks' liquidity behaviour between January 2004 and March 2010, when these banks were subject to a liquidity regulation that is very similar to Basel III's Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). We find that most banks hold more liquid assets against their stock of liquid...

This paper maps the empirical features of the Loan-to-Deposit (LTD) ratio with an eye on using it in macroprudential policy to mitigate liquidity risk. We inspect the LTD trends and cycles of 11 euro area countries by filtering methods and analyze the interaction between loans and deposits. We...

This paper models a financial sector in which there is a feedback between individual bank risk and aggregate funding market problems. Greater individual risk taking worsens adverse selection problems on the market. But adverse selection premia on that market push up bank risk taking, leading to...