Contents: 1. Multinationals: -- in theory and practice -- 2. From FDI to the MNE: -- Hymer and the roots of ownership advantage -- 3. From innovation to internationalisation: the product cycle model -- 4. From multi-domestic hierarchy to network hierarchy -- 5. Trade and FDI revisited: -- the...

The world of multinational enterprises is changing dramatically. Their complex and dynamic international context presents them with special challenges--threatening their survival on one hand, and presenting them with unprecedented opportunities on the other. In this volume, international experts...

This authoritative volume focuses on the rise of modern firms, from their early history to the present day. It considers the role of laws and contracts in shaping the growth and influence of business enterprises. It presents entrepreneurs, executives and the firms they controlled as driving...

We develop a theory of firm scope in which integrating two firms into one facilitates the allocation of resources, but leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the underlying agency problem. Moreover, the benefits and costs...

We show experimentally that a principal’s distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent’s motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents’ choice set...

We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...

In this paper, we discuss recent evidence from economic experiments that study the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and efficiency have been seen as opposing aims in such...

We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...