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Firms, governments, and economic change : an entrepreneurial perspective

Yu, Tony Fu-Lai - 2001

This topical book interprets firms, governments and economic change from an entrepreneurial perspective. Essentially, it applies the Austrian theory of human agency and evolutionary theories of the firm to explain economic organisation, the state and institutional change. Tony Yu begins by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014473745

Developments in the economics of privatization and regulation

Parker, David (contributor); Crew, Michael A. (contributor) - 2008

wave of privatization, starting in the UK, which made the regulation of monopoly of much greater interest. The discipline …, policymakers and regulators in the study of privatization and regulation … Perspectives, 12 (4), Fall, 133-50 -- Bruno Biais and Enrico Perotti (2002), 'Machiavellian Privatization', American Economic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852233

The German state banks : global players in the international financial markets

Sinn, Hans-Werner - 1999

The German state banks - or Landesbanks - are not only some of the largest banks in Germany but are also a dominant force in the international banking sector. These state-owned banks enjoy special privileges and government support which have made them major players in the global arena of banking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014473811

Resource Allocation and Firm Scope

Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

We develop a theory of firm scope in which integrating two firms into one facilitates the allocation of resources, but leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the underlying agency problem. Moreover, the benefits and costs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761852

Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts

Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703004

Equity and Efficiency in Multi-Worker Firms: Insights from Experimental Economics

Abeler, Johannes; Altmann, Steffen; Goerg, Sebastian; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

In this paper, we discuss recent evidence from economic experiments that study the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and efficiency have been seen as opposing aims in such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024592

Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion

Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566722

Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control

Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004

We show experimentally that a principal’s distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent’s motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents’ choice set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762323