Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Recent corporate governance scandals have brought to the fore the inherent contradictions of a capitalism dominated by financial markets. This challenging book by Michel Aglietta and Antoine Rebérioux argues that capitalism's basic premise--that companies must be managed in the sole interest of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011850595
pt. 1. Market structure, corporate governance and innovation -- pt. 2. Privatization, liberalization and R&D activities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011851058
1. The failure of good intentions : the collapse of American telecommunications after six years of Deregulation -- 2. Road networks : efficiency, externalities and consumer choice -- 3. The Enterprise Act : pluses and minuses for competition policy -- 4. Ofcom and light touch regulation -- 5....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011851906
We develop a theory of firm scope in which integrating two firms into one facilitates the allocation of resources, but leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the underlying agency problem. Moreover, the benefits and costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761852
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703004
In this paper, we discuss recent evidence from economic experiments that study the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and efficiency have been seen as opposing aims in such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024592
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566722
We show experimentally that a principal’s distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent’s motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents’ choice set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762323