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Rational trader risk
Kondor, Peter - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004
i.e. there is no noise trader risk. Instead, traders expect that new rational entrants with different information in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884635
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Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice
Fischer, Gregory - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011
explore this possibility, I develop a theory that unifies models of investment choice, informal risk sharing, and formal … financial contracts. I then test the predictions of this theory using a series of experiments with clients of a large … inefficiencies. First, borrowers free-ride on their partners, making risky investments without compensating partners for this risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746368
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Strategic investment, industry concentration and the cross section of returns
Bustamante, Maria Cecilia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011
competition a¤ects the industrial dynamics of investment, concentration, and expected returns. When firms have similar production …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071300
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The economics of e-commerce
Baye, Michael R. (contributor); Morgan, John (contributor) - 2016
Experiment', Experimental Economics, 9 (2), June, 79-101 -- Daniel Houser and John Wooders (2006), 'Reputation in Auctions … Experiment on MovieLens', American Economic Review, 100 (4), September, 1358-98 -- Judith A. Chevalier and Dina Mayzlin (2006 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012419900
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Using experimental methods in environmental and resource economics
List, John A. (contributor) - 2006
1. Anchoring and yea-saying with private goods : an experiment / Ian Bateman ... [et al.] -- 2. Market price … outcomes / Glenn W. Harrison -- 4. The use of a real-money experiment in a stated-preference survey / John Horowitz -- 5 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011851536
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Costly bargaining and renegotiation
Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998
We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928645
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Coordinating tasks in M-form and U-form organisations
Qian, Yingyi; Roland, Gerard; Xu, Cheng-Gang - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003
We model the coordination of specialised tasks inside an organisation as "attribute matching". Using this method, we compare the performance of organisational forms (M-form and U-form) in implementing changes such as innovation and reform. In our framework, organisational forms affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928762
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Hierarchic contracting
Sanchez, Miguel A.; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005
We analyze the contracting structure in a moral hazard setting with several agents where output is produced jointly and is the only contractible variable. Since the salary of each agent is a function of all agents efforts, a positive externality arises between them. This externality is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928768
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Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem
Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000
This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745037
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Costly coasian contracts
Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998
We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ‘contractual solution’ to this hold-up problem is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745370