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Simultaneous and sequential price competition in heterogeneous duopoly markets : experimental evidence

Kübler, Dorothea; Müller, Wieland - 2001

, just as predicted by the theory, whereas average follower prices are not above average prices in the simultaneous market … simultaneous-move markets whereas first movers do not. As in theory, there is a significant first-mover disadvantage when firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009617949

Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets : experimental evidence on firm-specific investment

Anderhub, Vital; Königstein, Manfred; Kübler, Dorothea - 1999

administered incentives. -- principal agent ; experiment ; specific human capital …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580472

Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

sequencing structure of game types, game rules do matter, and directional learning theory offers a partial explanation for bid …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102

Auctions and fair division games under different price rules : individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction types (first versus second price - auction versus fair division game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582405

Trust and reciprocity in the investment game with indirect reward

Güth, Werner; Königstein, Manfred; Marchand, Nadège; … - 2000

Experimental studies have shown that trust and reciprocity are effective in increasing efficiency when complete contracting is infeasible. One example is the study by Berg et al. (1995) of the investment game. In this game the person who receives the investment is the one who may reward the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612013

Limited depth of reasoning and failure of cascade formation in the laboratory

Kübler, Dorothea; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2000

player can obtain a signal for free (as in the experiment by Anderson and Holt, 1997, American Economic Review), the case of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612571

Combining rational choice and evolutionary dynamics : the indirect evolutionary approach

Königstein, Manfred; Müller, Wieland - 1999

that are well known from game theory and evolutionary game theory to solve these games. For illustration we include two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580475

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

observed in the experiment aim at fair surplus sharing. -- principal-agent theory ; contract theory ; fair sharing ; incentive …Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This … evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090

Using private job agencies : optimal screening or cream skimming?

Kübler, Dorothea - 1997

In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and unobservable effort choice, the role of public and private employment services is analyzed. The coexistence of an inefficient employment exchange and an efficient private agency may lead to optimal screening with first best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658470

On the regulation of social norms

Kübler, Dorothea - 2000

A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by "norm entrepreneurs", e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583884