In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium...

Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) can be detected by...

This seminal work advances beyond neoclassical economics to provide an integrated overview of economic decision making, and the management of bounded rationality and its evolutionary consequences. Clem Tisdell successfully combines recent developments in learning and game theory, transaction...

1. Introduction / Cary Cooper and George Saridakis -- 2. Employee turnover / Harald Dale-Olsen -- 3. Understanding and measuring employee turnover / Kevin Morrell -- 4. Two decades of employee retention, tenure and turnover / Peter Urwin and Emma Parry -- 5. Analysing, monitoring and costing...