Most of the literature on monetary policy delegation assumes that the government can credibly commit to the delegation contract, an assumption criticized by McCallum. This paper provides foundations for the assumption that renegotiating a delegation contract can be costly by illustrating how...

We find that contrary to common perception, cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted prisoner's dilemma is in many relevant cases not very plausible, or at least questionable: for a significant subset of the payoff-discount factor parameter space cooperation equilibria...

We study the consequences of 'leniency' - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on corruption, drug dealing, and other forms of sequential, bilateral, illegal trade. We find that when not properly designed, leniency may be highly...

The central bank's optimal reaction to foreign and domestic shocks is analyzed in an inflation targeting model allowing for incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Limited pass-through is incorporated through nominal rigidities in an aggregate supply-aggregate demand model derived from some...

The central bank's optimal objective function is analyzed in a small open economy model allowing for incomplete exchange rate pass-through. The results indicate that social welfare can only be marginally improved by including an explicit exchange-rate term in the delegated objective function,...

The performance of various monetary rules is investigated in an open economy with incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Implementing monetary policy through an exchange-rate augmented policy rule does not improve social welfare compared to using an optimized Taylor rule, irrespective of the...