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In this paper, I analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations of myopic best repliers, better repliers and imitators. In each period, one individual from each of n populations, one for each player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001622442
In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001600008
In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001622441
In a series of papers, Schelling presented a microeconomic model of neighbourhood segregation that he called a "spatial proximity model". The model specifies a spatial setup in which the individual agents care only about the composition of their own local neighbourhood. Agents belong to two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537463
A well known problem in economics is to describe properly a situation where N agents are repeatedly competing to use the same limited resource. A version of this problem is known in the literature as the El Farol game: week after week N agents face the decision whether to go or not to go to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537605
A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating or supressing links. We model this situation with an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Each agent plays with its local neighbors, collects an aggregate payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537766
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537792
In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090313
In this note we present both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a linear static state feedback controller if the system is described by an index one descriptor system. A priori no definiteness restrictions are made w.r.t. the quadratic performance criterium. It is shown...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090453
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090553