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In this paper we derive a unit root test against a Panel Logistic Smooth Transition Autoregressive (PLSTAR). The analysis is concentrated on the case where the time dimension is fixed and the cross section dimension tends to infinity. Under the null hypothesis of a unit root, we show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002577852
This paper studies a class of Markov models which consist of two components. Typically, one of the components is observable and the other is unobservable or 'hidden'. Conditions under which (a form of) geometric ergodicity of the unobservable component is inherited by the joint process formed of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002465203
In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001600008
We consider forward rate rate models of HJM type, as well as more general infinite dimensional SDEs, where the volatility/diffusion term is stochastic in the sense of being driven by a separate hidden Markov process. Within this framework we use the previously developed Hilbert space realization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001664233
In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001622441
In this paper, I analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations of myopic best repliers, better repliers and imitators. In each period, one individual from each of n populations, one for each player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy...
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