The empirical evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets is mixed. The problem in assessing the extent of adverse selection is that private information, on which agents act, is generally unobservable to the researcher, which makes it difficult to distinguish between adverse selection and...

Micro data from a dental insurance natural experiment is used to analyze why agents opt out of insurance. The purpose is to relate the dropout decision to new information on risk, acquired by the policy holder and the insurer. The results show that agents tend to leave the insurance when...

This paper studies a class of Markov models which consist of two components. Typically, one of the components is observable and the other is unobservable or 'hidden'. Conditions under which (a form of) geometric ergodicity of the unobservable component is inherited by the joint process formed of...

In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...

We consider forward rate rate models of HJM type, as well as more general infinite dimensional SDEs, where the volatility/diffusion term is stochastic in the sense of being driven by a separate hidden Markov process. Within this framework we use the previously developed Hilbert space realization...

In this paper, I analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations of myopic best repliers, better repliers and imitators. In each period, one individual from each of n populations, one for each player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy...