In this paper, I analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations of myopic best repliers, better repliers and imitators. In each period, one individual from each of n populations, one for each player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy...

In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...

In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and...

A large number of individuals are randomly matched into groups, where each group plays a finite symmetric game. Individuals breed true. The expected number of surviving offspring depends on own material payoff, but may also, due to cooperative breeding and/or reproductive competition, depend on...

We analyze how strategic asset trading can be used to gain competitive advantage. In the case of electricity markets, companies seek to improve the value of their generating portfolios by acquiring, or selling, power plants. Accordingly, we derive the basic determinants of plant value,...

In this paper we study a local version of the Minority Game where agents are placed on the nodes of a directed graph. Agents care about beingin the minority of the group of agents they are currently linked to and employ myopic best-reply rules to choose their next-period state. We show that, in...

In the last years, many contributions have been exploring population learning in economies where myopic agents play bilateral games and are allowed to repeatedly choose their pure strategies in the game and, possibly, their opponents in the game. These models explore bilateral stage-games...

Schelling [1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents' preferences, i.e., no agent preferring the resulting segregation. We...

We consider the classical prisoner's dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. Agents act profit-maximizing, fully rationally and base their decision only on local information. Individual decisions are made such that...