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In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...
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; Evolutionary game theory ; Evolutionary Stability ; Learning in games ; Belief learning ; Reinforcement learning …
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size. -- Bounded rationality ; Evolutionary game theory ; Imitation ; Better replies ; Markov chain ; Stochastic stability …
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