Most of the literature on monetary policy delegation assumes that the government can credibly commit to the delegation contract, an assumption criticized by McCallum. This paper provides foundations for the assumption that renegotiating a delegation contract can be costly by illustrating how...

Few propositions in macroeconomics are less controversial than long-run money neutrality, yet clear and robust empirical support has not been found in time series studies. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) are comparatively successful in this hunt, but their output response to monetary policy shocks...

New Keynesian models of monetary policy assign no role to monetary aggregates, in the sense that the level of output, prices, and interest rates can be determined without knowledge of the quantity of money. We evaluate the empirical validity of this prediction by studying the effects of shocks...

The Pareto dominance relation is shown to be the unique nontrivial partial order on the set of finite-dimensional real vectors satisfying a number of intuitive properties. -- Pareto dominance ; characterization

We summarize some methods useful in formulating and solving Hansen-Sargent robust control problems, and suggest extensions to discretion and simple rules. Matlab, Octave, and Gauss software is provided. We illustrate these extensions with applications to the term structure of interest rates, the...

Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices: salience, inertia, the formation of habits, the use of rules of thumb, or the locking in on certain modes of behavior due to learning by doing. This...

In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses ro every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403] relax this condition by only requiring the...