The empirical evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets is mixed. The problem in assessing the extent of … it difficult to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. Unique micro data, from a dental insurance … insurance makes it possible to observe a proxy for private information. Interestingly, results differ across risk classes …

Micro data from a dental insurance natural experiment is used to analyze why agents opt out of insurance. The purpose … show that agents tend to leave the insurance when reclassified into higher premium classes, or when experiencing … unexpectedly low dental care utilization within the insurance. They are more responsive to higher premiums than to lower expected …

One of the main features of health insurance is moral hazard, as defined by Pauly (1968); people face incentives for … problem, a coinsurance can be included in the insurance contract. We analyze under what conditions there is a conflict between … individuals on what coinsurance rate should be set with public health insurance, and we establish conditions for a median …