This research introduces the sequential bargaining to the standard screening model by allowing the agent to propose new contracts with strategic delay after the rejection of the principal's offer. We have found that if the difference between the types of agent are sufficiently large, the...

We produce a model with pre-marital schooling investment, endogenuos marital matching and spousal specialization in homework and market production. Schooling investments generate two kinds of returns in our framework: a labor-market return due to the education premium and a marriage-market...

Several recent papers (Shimer 2003a, 2003b; Costain and Reiter 2003; Hall 2003) have shown that general equilibrium labor market models have a hard time generating the degree of cyclical volatility in unemployment and vacancies that is observed in the data. These papers have suggested that rigid wages...

There is a positive and significant correlation of many traits, such as age, religion, socioeconomic status, and education, among spouses. Becker (1973) shows that positive assortative matching – which results in a perfect correlation of traits in spouses – is optimal if the traits...

We develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by pre-marital investments, the marriage market is charaterized by assortative matching, and endogenously-determined sharing rules form the basis of intra-household allocations. By incorporating pre-marital investments...

We consider an economy where trade is decentralized and agents have incomplete information with respect to the value of money. Agents' learning evolves from private experiences and we explore how the formation of prices interacts with learning. We show that multiple equilibria arise, and...