How do financial markets price new information? This paper analyzes price setting atthe intersection of private and public information, by testing whether and how thereaction of financial markets to public signals depends on the relative importance ofprivate information in agents’ information...

Existing work on wage bargaining (as exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi, 2001) typicallypredicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This insight has not beenconfirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation,thereby eliciting criticism from Posen and...

The purpose of the paper is to design optimal monetary policy rules in a New-Keynesian model featuring the presence of non-atomistic unions. It is shown that concentrated labor markets call for more aggressive inflation stabilization. This is because the central bank is able to induce wage...

This paper examines the impact of downward wage rigidity (nominal and real) onoptimal steady-state inflation. For this purpose, we extend the workhorse model ofErceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) by introducing asymmetric menu costs for wagesetting. We estimate the key parameters by simulated...