The notion of uncertain delivery is extended to study exchange economies in which agents have different abilities to distinguish between goods (for example a car in good condition versus a car in bad condition). In this setting, it is useful to distinguish goods not only by their physical...

Private state-verification is introduced in a two-period economy with spot markets in both periods and complete futures markets for contingent delivery in the second period. Existence of equilibrium is established, under standard assumptions. The equilibrium allocation is shown to be generically...

An economy with ex ante markets for future delivery contingent on ex post spot market prices is considered. Since spot prices are publicly observed ex post, this framework bypasses the enforcement problems that may arise as a result of differential information about states of nature....

We introduce a two-period economy with asymmetric information about the state of nature that occurs in the second period. Each agent is endowed with an information structure that describes her (incomplete) ability to prove whether or not a state has occurred. We show that if the number of states...

Private state verification is introduced in a two-period economy with spot markets in both periods and complete futures markets for contingent delivery in the second period. Existence of equilibrium is established, under standard assumptions. An example is presented in which a complete set of...

We study general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. Trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. It is useful to define a list of bundles as a derivative good that gives an agent the right to receive one of the bundles in the list....

In economies with uncertain delivery, agents trade their endowments for lists instead of bundles. A list specifies a set of bundles such that the agent has the right to receive one of them. In this paper, with continuity conditions on private beliefs about the bundle that will be delivered, we...

In an economy with private information, we introduce the notion of objects of choice as lists of bundles out of which the market selects one for delivery. This leads to an extension of the model of Arrow-Debreu that is used to study ex-ante trade with private state verification. The model does...

In economies with uncertain delivery, objects of choice are lists of bundles instead of bundles. Agents trade their endowments for lists, and it is the market that selects one of the bundles in the list for actual delivery. Knowledge of the selection mechanism allows agents to predict the bundle...