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A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543763
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How to allocate Research (and other) Subsidies
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008855232
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Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly
Hu, Luke - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556728
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Subsidies, Knapsack Auctions and Dantzig’s Greedy Heuristic
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785851
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Security bid auctions for agency contracts
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of … outperform all other auctions, although it cannot extract the entire surplus implement efficient effort. Hence, profit sharing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556730
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010668400
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License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for Losers
Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
licensing without reducing bidders’ surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785795
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Auctioning Process Innovations when Losers’ Bids Determine Royalty Rates
Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms’ bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008501954
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Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
of combining auctions and royalty contracts for losers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008501956
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License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers
Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed–fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739670