Showing 1 - 10 of 19
behaviour in a public-good experiment well? And if not, where does the observed behaviour diverge from the prediction? This … equilibrium prediction that is based on the elicited conditional-cooperation preferences. Moreover, more often than not, beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883484
incentive schemes have gradually crowded out cooperation as an organization device. Our explanation does not draw on free …-riding, the obvious Achilles’ heel of cooperation, but relies completely on fundamental group contest mechanisms. By investigating …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852907
redistribution. People earn money in a real effort experiment and can then decide how to distribute it among themselves and another …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009018525
Machiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in an experiment, in which an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009018527
’ truth telling is absolute or depends on the size of a lie. In a laboratory experiment we compare punishment for different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024100
This paper presents an experiment on the loyalty enhancing effect potentially created by retroactive price reduction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010704370
This paper presents results from an experiment studying a two-person 4x4 pure coordination game. We seek to identify a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010704371
In Geng, Weiss, and Woff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011070844
Are people blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process? We conduct an experimental voting game and analyze how pivotality affects responsibility attribution by parties who can be negatively affected by the voting outcome. We measure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011070849
maximal contribution. Efficient voluntary cooperation in the repeated best shot game therefore requires that only one player … should contribute in a given round. To provide better chances for such cooperation, we enrich the sequential best shot base … party. Participants easily establish cooperation in the finitely repeated game. When cooperation evolves, it mostly takes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011070853