The understanding of the economy's aggregate growth patterns is a fundamental objective of economic growth theorizing. However, the micro constructions are strongly linked to economic growth and so cannot be neglected in such process. This paper is concerned with this problem, proposing a formal...

In the contemporary globalising knowledge-based economies, local clusters have become crucial elements of regional development, assuming a significant role in both academic and political fields. Although there is an intuitive awareness about the raising importance of the theoretical debate on...

In a market with several independent cities, two firms with private information about their production costs decide whether to open a store in each city or restrict their activity to some cities. In cities where a single rm opens a store, this firm is a monopolist. In cities where both firms...

An economy with ex ante markets for future delivery contingent on ex post spot market prices is considered. Since spot prices are publicly observed ex post, this framework bypasses the enforcement problems that may arise as a result of differential information about states of nature....

We study general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. Trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. It is useful to define a list of bundles as a derivative good that gives an agent the right to receive one of the bundles in the list....

The present work analyzes the multinational firm's decision concerning the relocation of production from a country where it is currently settled, to another foreign country, assuming that the government of this country has private information on his specific type (type G or type B, with the...

The present paper analyses the multinational firm's decision on where to subcontract in a context of asymmetric information. When a multinational firm (MNF) intends to subcontract the production of a good to a foreign firm, it faces an adverse selection problem. In fact, at the outset, foreign...

This paper presents a game where the incumbent firm uses the price as a signal about demand size. Without observing the demand, the regulator has to decide if the entry of new firms will be allowed. The game has a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the incumbent firm chooses the...

We investigate the continuity of equilibrium in differential information economies with a finite number of agents. In this setting, agents can make contingent contracts based on events that are commonly observed. With private information modelled as finite partitions of a compact and metrizable...

We study regulation of a bureaucratic provider of a public good in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. By bureaucratic we mean that it values output in itself, and not only profit. Three different financing systems are studied - cost reimbursement, prospective payment, and the...