allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentially compatible … payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be …

two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in … kernel-based set that, together with the core, characterizes the set of SMB. …

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that … this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also …

We study the behaviour of the extreme points of the core of a game in front of the reduction of the game and prove that … the extreme core points have the reduced game property but not the converse reduced game property. Nevertheless we give … some sufficient conditions on an extreme point of the core of a reduced game to extend to an extreme core point of the …

Uniform{price assignment games are introduced as those assignment mar- kets with the core reduced to a segment. In … allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus. …

-Bawerk assignment games to situations with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the extreme core allocations of any multi-sided B … sellers and buyers. We also study when the core of these games is stable in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern. …

We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and …

A necessary condition for the coincidence of the bargaining sets dened by Shimomura (1997) and the core of a … introduced. This necessary condition simply checks whether these vectors are core elements of the game. …