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In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the core of the game. These games will be called buyerseller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixedpair coalition attains the corresponding matrix...
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Uniform{price assignment games are introduced as those assignment mar- kets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only...
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We consider one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands and prove that the associated game is buyers-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation where every buyer receives his marginal contribution. We prove that in this kind...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010797791
On the domain of two-sided assignment markets, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency (Owen, 1992) and complaint mono- tonicity on sectors size. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of...
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We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with nonnegative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005138819
Singlevalued solutions for the case of twosided market games without product differentiation, also known as B ohmBawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this set of games in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005600429
In the framework of two-sided assignment markets, we first consider that among several markets, the players may choose where to trade. It is shown that the corresponding game, represented by the maximum of a finite set of assignment games, may not be balanced. Some conditions for balancedness...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005176408