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We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with nonnegative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of...
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We consider one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands and prove that the associated game is buyers-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation where every buyer receives his marginal contribution. We prove that in this kind...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010797791
On the domain of two-sided assignment markets, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency (Owen, 1992) and complaint mono- tonicity on sectors size. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of...
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Singlevalued solutions for the case of twosided market games without product differentiation, also known as B ohmBawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this set of games in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005600429
In the framework of two-sided assignment markets, we first consider that among several markets, the players may choose where to trade. It is shown that the corresponding game, represented by the maximum of a finite set of assignment games, may not be balanced. Some conditions for balancedness...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005176408
The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005176415
We extend Rochfords (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005022339