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Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
Tejada, Oriol; Rafels, Carles - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2009
kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). We also give an answer to an open question formulated by Rochford (1983) by introducing a … kernel-based set that, together with the core, characterizes the set of SMB. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005022339
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All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus
Oliva, Marina Nunez - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2004
There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005022346
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Uniform-price assignment markets
Oliva, Marina Nunez; Pallarola, Carlos Rafels - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2005
{Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005022371
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A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game
Llerena, Francesc; Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009292855
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The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games
Llerena, Francesc; Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008690922