Corporate managers and executive compensation in many industries place significant emphasis on measures of firm size, such as sales revenue or market share. Such objectives have an important yet thus far unquantified impact on market performance. With n symmetric firms, equilibrium welfare...

Corporate managers and executive compensation in many industries place significant emphasis on measures of firm size, such as sales revenue or market share. Such objectives have an important - yet thus far unquantifed - impact on market performance. With n symmetric firms, equilibrium welfare...

This paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms’ ability to collude. Real world imperfections tend to makes firms’ objective function strictly concave and market supergames ‘interdependent’: firms’ payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others. Then,...

The paper surveys the literature and publicly available information on market power monitoring in electricity wholesale markets. After briefly reviewing definitions, strategies and methods of mitigating market power we examine the various methods of detecting market power that have been employed...

This paper is an extension of the paper 'The Robustness of Agent-Based Models of Electricity Wholesale Markets', EPRG1213 which was motivated by the problem of analysing market power in liberalised electricity markets. That paper examined two particular forms of agent-based models commonly used...

Agent-based modelling is an attractive way of finding equilibria in complex problems involving strategic behaviour, particularly in electricity markets with transmission constraints. However, while it may be possible to demonstrate convergence of learning behaviour to a Nash equilibrium, that is...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

What would happen if firms could collusively choose cost of transport (inconvenience) in Hotelling's spatial model? This paper endogenises inconvenience in a three stage game, where firms choose locations, the inconvenience, and finally compete in price, on the assumption of a common reservation...

It is difficult to elminated all market power in electricity markets and it is therefore frequently suggested that some market power should be tolerated: extra revenues contribute to fixed cost recovery, facilitate investment and increase security of supply. This suggestion implicitly assumes...

This paper shows that generators exercised increasing market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market in the second half of the 1990s despite declining market concentration. It examines whether this was consistent with static, non-cooperative oligopoly models, which are widely...