We explore the different competitive mechanisms applied by electric utilities from the USA in promoting cost-effective Distribution Generation (DG) resources and the challenges that they face due to the increase in DG connections. Case studies from California, Oregon, Colorado and New York are...

Energy policy aims to deliver security, sustainability and affordability, but politicians treat security of supply as over-riding. Absent market and regulatory failures, liberalized energy-only electricity markets might deliver adequate capacity. Ambitious targets for subsidized renewables and...

Transport constraints limit competition and arbitrageurs' possibilities of exploiting price differences between commodities in neighbouring markets. We analyze a transportation network where oligopoly producers compete with supply functions under uncertain demand, as in wholesale electricity...

One of the biggest challenges in the area of infrastructure investment is the provision of funding to finance activities. This paper presents an auction design which can reduce the financing cost of infrastructure investments by allowing the length of the regulatory funding period to be...

In most network asset procurement exercises, network configurations are predefined by the auctioneers. Bidders can neither propose different network configurations nor can they submit bids on a group of network links. We believe the market itself can be designed better. We present a lot...

In multi-unit auctions, such as auctions of commodities and securities, and financial exchanges, it is necessary to specify rationing rules to break ties between multiple marginal bids. The standard approach in the literature and in pratice is to ration marginal bids proportionally. This paper...

Auctions are playing an increasingly prominent role in the planning and operation of energy markets. Comparing the New Electricity Trading Arrangements to the former electricity Pool in England and Wales requires some analysis of the relative merits of uniform versus discriminatory pricing...

When access to monopoly owned networks is constrained auctioning access rights can increase the efficiency of allocations relative to negotiation and grandfathering when there is sufficient competition among network users. Historically, access rights to entry capacity on the British gas network...

In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit stepfunction offers of supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be modelled as the purestrategy, Nash...

The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry....